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Blocking causal interpretations between juxtaposed propositions: experimental evidence  
Understanding what allows comprehenders to draw causal connections between events is central 
to understanding how a discourse is made coherent. Juxtaposed propositions are regularly 
ambiguous between causal and non-causal interpretations. In (1), the mayor’s election can be 
interpreted as having caused the riot, as having preceded but not caused the riot, or as one of two 
unrelated facts about the world. 
1) The mayor was elected. There was a riot. 
2) Because the mayor was elected, there was a riot. 
Causal connections can be left implicit as in (1) or made explicit via an overt marker like the 
connective because in (2). Models of discourse coherence (e.g., Asher & Lascarides, 2003; 
Kehler, 2002) distinguish between causal and non-causal relations but assume that, in the 
absence of an overt connective, the inference of such relations depends largely on real-world 
knowledge and the ability to reason about the speaker’s intended message. For example, the 
causal reasoning associated with so-called IMPLICIT CAUSALITY verbs guides the establishment 
of coherence: Passages with such verbs favor causal relations (e.g. a verb like congratulate raises 
questions about the reason for the congratulations in a way that babysit does not; Kehler, Kertz, 
Rohde, & Elman, 2008). As such, the real-world knowledge triggered by a verb’s lexical 
semantics influences coherence. Little work, however, has addressed the role of a sentence’s 
syntactic marking in the inference of causal connections. In this paper, we move beyond 
coherence-signaling connectives and the lexical semantics of verbs to explore effects from the 
syntactic clause-marker that. 
Bjorkman (2010) proposes that in embedded contexts like (3), the presence of an overt 
complementizer can block causal interpretations. The complementizer does not alter what is said 
(semantics) or what is meant (pragmatics) by each of the embedded propositions; it merely 
changes the syntactic form.  We test experimentally whether the presence/absence of a 
complementizer affects the inference of causality.  
3) The newspaper reported that the mayor was elected and (that) there was a riot. 
Experiment.  In 32 sentences like (3), we manipulated the presence/absence of the second that.  
The two propositions were always embedded under a complement-taking verb like report and 
were designed to be ambiguous between causal and non-causal interpretations (i.e., the election 
causing or not causing the riot). Fillers used connectives to explicitly signal causal (because) or 
non-causal (despite, unrelated to) readings. Forty participants, recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, were asked to indicate on a 1-5 scale how likely the first embedded clause was 
to have caused the second (“definitely not causally related”…“definitely causally related”). 
Results.  After excluding two participants whose ratings on the fillers indicated they failed to 
understand the task, the results confirmed that the presence of that at the beginning of the second 
embedded clause significantly lowered causal interpretations (p<0.05 in a mixed-effects model). 
Our findings provide experimental support for Bjorkman’s claim about the effect of 
complementizers on causality. It suggests that models of causal reasoning in discourse 
processing should incorporate cues from sentences’ surface form, alongside cues from lexical, 
semantic, and pragmatic sources.  
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